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De Facto New Phase II?
Federalism:
John Shannon
1985 marked year seven for defacto newfederalism, thefiscal decentralization process nudged
along by strong public support for the Reagan administration's conservative policies and
growingfiscal stringency at thefederal level. Newfederalism is most dramatically illustrated by
the national government retreat along the entire state-local aidfront— a kind of "sorting
out"— as an increasing share of thefederal budget goes to strictly national government
programs. The mounting public concern about massivefederal deficits will quicken thefederal
pullback on the state-local aidfront. The only question is whether it will be a ragged retreat or
an orderly withdrawal. The tighteningfiscal squeeze in Washington is also slowly but surely
reversing a fifty-year centralizing trend— the power pendulum is swinging back toward states
and localities, thereby creating a better balance within ourfederal system.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the
members of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
De facto new federalism is a sorting-out process, but not the nice, neat, orderly one
that political scientists and reformers yearn for. Nor has it evolved along the tax
turnback and program swap lines advocated in 1982 by the Reagan administration.
Rather, this new federalism (which actually started in the latter half of the Carter
administration) is most dramatically illustrated by the national government retreat
along the entire state-local aid front.
Nevertheless, de facto new federalism clearly represents a "sorting out" of sorts. As
more and more federal resources are being earmarked for national government
programs— defense, Social Security, Medicare, and payment of the interest on a $1.8
trillion U.S. debt— state and local governments are being forced to fend for
themselves.
New De Facto Federalism vs. Old Federalism
The new fiscally austere federalism can best be understood by comparing it to the
affluent old federalism, which began at the end of the Korean War and ended in
1978— the year of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the California taxpayer
revolt.
Old federalism was characterized by steadily growing local dependence on federal
aid as the nation increasingly looked to Washington to set the domestic agenda. New
John Shannon is executive director of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. He
previously served at the federal level on the White House staff.
federalism is marked by steadily decreasing state-local reliance on federal-aid dollars
as the country increasingly looks first to the localities and then to the states to handle
domestic issues (see figure 1).
Figure 1
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The Rise and Decline of Federal Aid
(federal aid as % state-local budget)
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1986 estimate based on annual growth in state-local general expenditures from 1979 to 1984 (9.3%)
Source: ACIR staff compilation based on federal-aid figures from U.S. Budget, FY 86, Historical
Tables, table 12.1. State-local general expenditures from U.S. Census government finance series
(annual)
Old federalism was intrusive in character— a steadily growing number of federal
aid "strings" and conditions were designed to alter state and local budgetary priorities
and to race state and local fiscal engines. New federalism is becoming increasingly
extrusive in character— the federal government is pulling aid funds and tax resources
from state and local governments to strengthen the financing of its own national
programs.
Old federalism represented a continuous but unplanned advance of the national
government into areas that had heretofore been the exclusive province of state and
local governments. New federalism represents a continuous but unplanned retreat
from federal positions staked out during the Great Society era.
Old federalism called on Washington to provide extra aid to stabilize state and
local finances during periods of economic recession. New federalism calls on the
states to help themselves by setting up rainy day funds to cushion their finances from
the shock of economic downturns.
Old federalism flourished in a political environment that resolved the political and
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fiscal doubts in favor of social equity concerns, domestic public-sector growth, and
defense contraction. De facto new federalism operates in a political climate that
resolves the doubts in favor of economic development, defense expansion, and
domestic public-sector containment.
The Gathering Fiscal Storm
Phase I of de facto new federalism (1978-85) evolved against the backdrop of a
gathering fiscal storm and produced a remarkable contrast: expenditure acceleration
in Washington and expenditure deceleration at the state-local level (see figure 2).
The Three Rs
What caused the great slowdown in state-local outlays after 1978? For the first time
since the end of World War II, it became much easier for most state and locally
elected officials to say no rather than yes to proposals calling for expenditure
increases. This newfound fiscal discipline was dictated by the three Rs: revolt of the
taxpayers, reductions in federal-aid flows, and the recession.
The Three Ds
While state-local expenditures leveled off after the passage of Proposition 13, ' federal
expenditures continued their steady upward climb, rising in constant dollars from
Figure 2
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$1,377 per capita in 1978 to $1,700 in 1985. Figure 3 breaks down these federal
expenditures into two components: constant and variable expenditures. There are two
constants (shown on the top panel); one is Social Security plus Medicare, and the
other is net interest payments on the federal debt. Neither constant is susceptible to
rapid changes in the near future by either presidential or congressional action. The
inexorable rise of expenditures for net interest payments is driven by large federal
deficits and the consequent increase in the national debt, combined with continued
high interest rates. The equally impressive rise in expenditures for Social Security and
Medicare results from our steadily aging population, which means that each year
more and more people are entitled to federal retirement benefits and insurance
payments for medical care.
Variable expenditures— those which can be more readily changed by executive or
congressional action— have been divided into three categories: national defense,
federal aid to state and local governments, and all other federal programs. Expendi-
tures for federal aid to state and local governments dropped sharply after 1978 and
leveled off after 1981. Expenditures for all the other federal programs began a steady
drop in 1981. The other variable, national defense, began to rise after 1978 and
accelerated sharply after the Reagan administration took office and started to
implement its promise to strengthen the nation's defenses.
Thus, the steady advance in federal expenditures can be traced to the driving force
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of the three Ds— deficits, defense, and demographics (shorthand for Social Security
and Medicare).
Massive Budget Deficits
There is an iron law that governs the federal budget process: nothing short of a
searing crisis can generate the consensus needed for federal policymakers to take
unpopular actions such as enacting major tax hikes or making cuts in programs that
have strong constituencies. Absent a full-blown crisis, federal officials avoid making
these hard budget choices by papering over the budget gap with deficit financing
when receipts fall short of steadily rising expenditure demands. Unlike their state and
local counterparts, federal officials have not been disciplined by a balanced budget
mandate. 2 31
In a semicrisis situation, federal authorities can enact modest "revenue
enhancements" and slow down the growth of programs that have relatively weak
political constituencies. Many of the federal aid programs to states and localities fall
into this classification. As a result, federal aid is the first major component of the
budget to feel the fiscal squeeze— an early warning signal to the constituencies of
more popular federal expenditure programs that there may be serious budget trouble
ahead.
From a budgetary standpoint, 1985 was another very bad year for the national
government. For the fiscal year ending September 30, 1985, the budget deficit totaled
$212 billion 3—an amount about equal to the total tax collectionsfor allfifty state
governments combined.
The national government has spent more than it has raised in taxes in twenty-four
of the past twenty-five years, but the size of the annual deficit has become progres-
sively greater over the past three decades. In the late 1950s, annual federal budget
deficits averaged about 3 percent of total expenditures; by the 1980s, the average had
climbed to 17 percent of total federal outlays (see figure 4).
The Watershed Year— 1986
Future historians of the American federal system are likely to designate 1986 as a
watershed year— the beginning of Phase II of de facto new federalism. Why? Because
this long-gathering fiscal storm will probably hit Washington full force in 1986. As a
result, in 1986, for the first time since the outbreak of the Korean War, we may see
the trend line for federal expenditures (as measured in real per capita terms and
adjusted for inflation) begin to flatten out and then remain fairly flat for the next
several years. This remarkable change in Washington's fiscal behavior is likely to be
produced by the interaction of two powerful factors: the public demand to cut deficits
and balance the budget, and the stout opposition of a popular president to a major
federal tax increase.
The first factor
—
growing political demand to cut deficits— certainly proves that
quantitative fiscal changes can have qualitative political effects. For years, federal
budget deficits attracted remarkably little public attention; now they have reached
such massive proportions that they are widely viewed as posing a clear and present
danger to the nation's economic health.
Congress will be forced to come to grips with the painful deficit issue more quickly
than most Washington watchers would have predicted even a few short months ago.
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Figure 4
Annual Budget Deficit as a Percentage of Federal Expenditures
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1985 est.
1985 estimate from OMB Mid-Session Review of Budget, 20 August 1985
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The Federal Budget for 1984, table 24, and ACIR staff
computations
Why are we surprised? Because there existed and still exists a widespread and deeply
pessimistic belief that Washington is so paralyzed by special-interest politics and
partisan conflicts that only a major economic depression or the imposition of a
dramatic remedy— a constitutional balanced budget amendment 4— could force the
Congress and the White House to cut the deficit sharply. Most of us overlooked the
fiscal crisis opportunity provided by the congressional need to raise its ceiling on the
national debt. 5
Assuming that the Reagan administration continues to block any major federal tax
increase, then the road to deficit reduction and balanced budgets will be paved largely
with major cuts in domestic programs (excluding Social Security), because
expenditure freezes will no longer do the job.
We will enter Phase II ofdefacto newfederalism when the trend lineforfederal
expenditures begins to flatten out and there are actual and substantial cuts in total
federal aidflowsfor several years in a row. In striking contrast, total federal aid flows
to states and localities actually grew slowly during most of the years between 1978
and 1985, despite the fact that certain small programs were wiped out and many
others were "frozen."
Three Hard Questions
The likely prospect of real and sustained cuts in federal aid flows to states and locali-
ties poses three hard questions:
Will the poorest jurisdictions be at least partially shielded from federal
budget cuts?
Will the federal aid programs that help states and localities care for poor
people be declared off limits to the budget cutters?
Will states and localities be protected from new federal mandates that
come without federal reimbursement?
Special FinancialA ssistancefor Poor Governments
Our federation is unique because it has not dealt directly with the poor government
problem. The other major federations— Australia, Canada, and West Germany
—
provide special fiscal aid to those states with the most anemic revenue sources.
As illustrated by the data in table 1, the states with relatively the lowest fiscal
capacity in New England (Vermont and Maine) are likely to be the hardest hit by
across-the-board federal aid cuts. A persuasive case can be made for the construction
of some form of a special fiscal safety net for the poorest states. 6
Continued FederalA idfor Poor People
The present federal aid "system" is composed of about four hundred large, medium,
and small grants that cut across the entire range of the domestic public sector. In my
opinion, such programs as AFDC, Medicaid, and food stamps should not be placed
on the budgetary chopping block. The federal government should continue to honor
its commitment to help states and localities take care of poor people. The federal
government should hold to this commitment even if it means the total elimination of
aid programs in areas that have lower national priority.
No New Mandates Without New FederalMoney
Many state and local officials fear the worst case scenario— that Congress will
become even more inclined to flex its regulatory muscles and impose mandates
without money now that it can no longer afford to bribe states and localities with
"tied" financial grants.
In its recent Garcia decision,7 the U.S. Supreme Court flashed the greenest of green
lights to would-be federal regulators. In that close decision (5-4) the high Court told
the states and localities that they could no longer hide behind judicial robes and plead
the Tenth Amendment when affronted by an exercise of congressional regulatory
power. In effect, the Supreme Court majority announced that it would no longer
referee disputes involving state claims for immunity from congressional efforts to
regulate interstate commerce. Thus, states and localities will now have to fight their
own political battles in the congressional arena.
In the short run, the states and localities need (as an irreducible minimum)
legislation requiring the national government to reimburse states and localities for the
costs imposed by any new federal mandates. In the long run, our federal system may
need some form of a constitutional amendment to make sure that the Supreme Court
continues to play its historic role as arbiter of power conflicts between the national
government and the states.
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Federal Aid to State and Local Governments for FY84
(Federal Aid Per Capita and as a Percentage of State- Local
General Revenue by Geographic Region with National Ranking)
State
Federal
Aid
(in millions)
Per Capita
Federal
Aid Rank
Federal Aid
as a % of
State- Local
Gen. Revenue Rank
Per Capita
Personal
Income
Calendar
Year 1984
Arizona
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Texas
859.0
653.4
1,092.5
4,389.1
281
459
331
275
49
19
43
50
13.4
15.1
16.3
14.2
50
43
36
48
11,841
10,260
11,655
12,572
Rank
United States $97,052.4 $411 17.9% $12,789
New England 5,699.1 453 3 19.3 14,421
Connecticut 1,138.0 361 36 14.9 45 16,557 3
Maine 533.6 462 17 22.6 7 10,817 38
Massachusetts 2,904.0 501 10 20.6 13 14,783 5
New Hampshire 331.3 339 41 18.5 27 13,188 16
Rhode Island 487.9 507 9 20.5 15 12,818 18
Vermont 304.2 574 5 24.9 2 10,798 40
Mideast 21 ,640.6 506 1 18.4 14,004
Delaware 295.6 482 12 17.6 31 13,675 11
Dist. of Col. 1,253.8 2,013 1 42.5 1 17,108 2
Maryland 1,710.8 393 27 16.3 37 14,464 7
New Jersey 2,790.0 371 32 14.7 46 15,440 4
New York 10,937.7 617 4 18.7 23 14,318 8
Pennsylvania 4,652.7 391 29 18.5 28 12,314 27
Great Lakes 16,679.2 401 5 17.8 12,740
Illinois 4,796.7 417 22 18.7 25 13,802 10
Indiana 1,775.7 323 47 17.2 32 11,717 32
Michigan 4,340.6 478 13 18.2 30 12,607 21
Ohio 3,745.9 348 39 16.8 35 12,355 26
Wisconsin 2,020.3 424 20 17.2 33 12,475 23
Plains 6,704.9 383 6 17.1 12,555
Iowa 1,046.8 360 37 16.8 34 12,159 29
Kansas 802.9 329 44 15.0 44 13,249 14
Minnesota 1,928.5 463 16 15.8 40 13,246 15
Missouri 1,630.7 326 46 18.9 22 12,150 30
Nebraska 559.8 349 38 15.8 39 12,430 24
North Dakota 376.1 548 6 20.3 16 12,360 25
South Dakota 360.1 510 8 23.0 6 11,067 36
Southeast 19,779.0 355 7 19.1 11,182
Alabama 1,540.6 386 30 20.0 17 9,992 47
Arkansas 876.8 373 31 23.1 5 9,805 48
Florida 2,938.1 268 51 14.5 47 12,763 20
Georgia 2,444.4 419 21 20.8 11 11,550 35
Kentucky 1,479.0 397 26 22.5 8 10,300 43
Louisiana 1,798.8 403 25 18.2 29 10,810 39
Mississippi 1,059.8 408 23 23.2 4 8,777 51
North Carolina 2,130.5 346 40 19.7 18 10,850 37
South Carolina 1,109.4 336 42 19.3 20 10,117 45
Tennessee 1,845.6 391 28 23.4 3 10,418 42
Virginia 1,765.6 313 48 16.0 38 13,253 13
West Virginia 790.4 405 24 21.0 9 9,729 50
Southwest 6,994.0 294 8 14.5 12,212
31
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Table 1 (cont.)
Federal Aid to State and Local Governments for FY84
(Federal Aid Per Capita and as a Percentage of State- Local
General Revenue by Geographic Region with National Ranking)
State
California
Nevada
Oregon
Washington
Alaska
Hawaii
Federal
Aid
(in millions)
Per Capita
Federal
Aid Rank
Federal Aid
as a % of
State- Local
Gen. Revenue Rank
Per Capita
Personal
Income
Calendar
Year 1984
12,171.5
298.4
1,268.1
1,614.0
492.9
510.3
475
328
474
371
986
491
14
45
15
33
2
11
18.7
13.8
19.2
15.7
8.2
19.4
24
49
21
41
51
19
14,488
13,317
11,613
12,792
17,478
13,038
Rank
Rocky Mountain 3,200.6 447 4 18.2 11,878
Colorado 1,160.2 365 34 15.6 42 13,846 9
Idaho 364.0 364 35 20.6 14 10,089 46
Montana 446.7 542 7 20.9 10 10,546 41
Utah 760.0 460 18 20.6 12 9,730 49
Wyoming 469.7 919 3 18.6 26 12,235 28
Far West* 15,352.0 458 2 18.2 14,007
6
12
34
19
1
17
35
*Excluding Alaska and Hawaii
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 6 November 1985
Ragged Retreat or Orderly Withdrawal?
It is now clear that the federal government will be forced by massive and growing
fiscal pressure to quicken its retreat along the entire federal aid front. It is to be
hoped that the retreating feds will treat the wounded (the poor) as humanely and
their allies (state and local governments) as decently as a bad fiscal situation will
permit. To put the issue more directly, let us hope that the federal pullback will be
conducted in a way that will minimize state and local casualties.
The federal aid issue, however, must be viewed in terms of a larger and harsher
reality. While federal aid cuts can sting badly, a return to double-digit inflation
followed by a severe and protracted economic recession can do far more damage to
most state and local governments. To prevent a serious economic downturn, the
federal government must cut deficits substantially.
Ideally, this deficit-reduction strategy will be conducted in a way that avoids
placing too heavy a strain on the federal-state-local partnership. But even if it is
conducted in a harsh and clumsy fashion, one thing is certain: federal deficit
reduction is still in the long-range interest of every state and local government in our
federation.
Two Bright Spots
Despite this gloomy assessment of the national government's fiscal plight, there are
two bright spots: the remarkable resilience of state and local governments and the
bracing effect of fiscal decentralization on our federal system.
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The fiscal resilience of states and localities is one of the most underrated features of
the American federal system. During the past eight years, the state and local sectors
have been severely jolted by double-digit inflation, major recessions, the taxpayers'
revolt, and a real slowdown in federal-aid flows. Yet most states and localities are
now in far better financial shape than most students of public finance would have
dared to predict three years ago.
The remarkable change in the expectations of state and local officials stands out as
the second bright spot. They no longer look to Washington to finance their new
initiatives. In short, we have entered a do-it-yourself era of fiscal federalism.
The tightening fiscal squeeze underscores an old truism: federalism is finance.
Budgetary realities are inexorably forcing Washington to devolve more and more
?£ responsibility to states and localities.
Notes
1. In 1978, California voters approved Proposition 13, which amended the California constitution to
institute a four-point program for sharply cutting back state and local taxes. It mandated that (1) as
of July 1, 1978, no property could be taxed at more than 1 percent of its estimated 1975-76 market
value; (2) no property tax assessment can be increased in any one year by more than 2 percent
unless that property is sold, at which time it can be reassessed on the basis of its market value; (3)
no local tax can be increased and no new tax imposed without the approval of two thirds of the
qualified voters; and (4) no additional state taxes can be imposed unless approved by at least two
thirds of the total membership of both houses of the legislature.
California's enactment of Proposition 13 prompted similar measures limiting taxes and expendi-
tures in many other states.
2. Congress responded to public demand to cut deficits and balance the budget by shaping and
then enacting the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit control measure in December 1985. The
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal became PL 99-177 when it was signed by the president on
December 12, 1985. This measure put both houses of Congress squarely on record in favor of
reducing the deficit to zero in fiscal 1991 by forcing a series of across-the-board cuts in nonex-
empt programs each year if regular budget and appropriations actions fail to achieve annual
goals for reducing the deficit. Only Social Security, interest on the federal budget, and a few vet-
erans' and social programs (such as AFDC) are exempt from automatic cut provisions.
3. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Joint Statement of James A. Baker III, Secretary of the
Treasury, and James C. Miller III, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, on Budget
Results for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1985, issued 25 October 1985.
4. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is not a constitutional balanced budget amendment. It is a statutory
balanced budget provision that can be altered with relative ease.
5. The architects of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings exploited this opportunity for leverage.
6. It should also be noted that Senators Dan Evans (R-Washington) and David Durenberger (R-
Minnesota) proposed legislation to partially shield poor local governments from the losses they
would suffer from the complete elimination of the general revenue sharing program.
7. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al., 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1985.
